ILLUSTRATIONS

Photographs 5, 10 and 16 have been copied from the Capital report.

Photographs 7, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 15 are from Mr Lord's report.

1. The front of the terrace. Number 9 is on the left: 15 is at the right. This image, taken in April 2022, was copied from Google Maps.

2. The rear of the terrace prior to the fire. This view, from a Microsoft Map file, was taken in July 2011. (The cedar tree visible on the other side of the terrace was subsequently felled.) No 15 is on the left: no 9 is on the right.

3. A Microsoft maps "birds-eye" view taken at unknown time before the fire. The back gardens of nos. 13 and 11 have been concreted over. That of no. 11 contains a large shed at its rear with two other structures and what appears to be a dividing screen nearer the house. The yard of no 13 is relatively empty. The timber fence separating this yard from the garden of 15 is clearly visible.

4. A Google "satellite" view taken a few years before the fire, with fewer items in the yard of no 11. The dashed red square shows the extent of the external fire. The rear yards and gardens are each about 5 metres wide by 8 m long. The external fire covered about 50 m^2 – more than the footprint of a house.

5. The front of the terrace. No 9 is on the left, mostly out of view. The house with the most severe damage is no 11, with 13 at centre right and 15 on the far right

6. An enlargement of part of the previous photograph showing the party wall between no 11 and no 13. Most of the tiling battens have been destroyed by fire but some remain in place near the eaves. There should have been fire-stopping between the battens where they pass over the party wall: none is visible. It might have fallen away in the fire but I think it more likely that it was never present.

7. At the rear. A blackened section of uPVC eaves soffit is hanging down at the approximate position of the party wall between 15 and 13.

8. The yards at the rear of 13 and 11 seen from beyond the line of the rear fence. The pattern of damage to the uPVC cladding corresponds to what I would expect from flames from a severe fire burning close to the building and involving the whole width of the yard to no 11, plus the fences on either side. This flame impingement seems to have extended beyond the lines of the party walls to destroy areas of cladding on both no 13 and no 9. This photograph, copied from Parikiaki, was taken by the London Fire Brigade.

9. A view from the garden at the rear of no 9. The timber fence between the yard of 11 and the garden of 9 has been consumed by fire. The arrow indicates what appears to be a section of non-combustible board.

10. The yard at the rear of 11 contained many items, judging by the debris. The timber fences either side of the yard – one of which would have been directly in front of the camera – have been consumed by fire. The pinkish hue of the cladding on 9 is typical of heat damage.

11. The rear of no 9. The destruction of the uPVC cladding seems to have been caused partly by direct flame impingement from the external fire involving the yard of 11 and the intervening fence, and partly as a result of fire inside the house burning through the plasterboard on the inside of the wall frames. The cladding remaining in place is damaged by heat but there has been no spread of flame across its surface.

12. At the rear of 13. Some uPVC cladding had been softened by heat and had fallen away, exposing the wall frame behind. There is no underlying plywood at this point just mineral fibre (arrow) and the plasterboard inner lining. There has clearly been no spread of fire over the cladding here.

13. The party wall between 11 and 9. The wall frames of each house had been bolted to a concrete support post with the party wall built tight against the back of this post. The spaces between the post and the edges of the wall frames had presumably been packed with insulation and covered externally by some board material, now destroyed. A section of what appears to be a non-combustible board remains in position (arrow). This might have been a later repair given that it is only present on one side of the party line.

14. An enlargement of part of photograph 8 showing a charred area of board covering the concrete support post between 13 and 11. This could have been plywood. It would have been covered by the uPVC cladding. I doubt that there could have been a cavity allowing horizontal fire-spread behind the board and I also doubt that there would have been much of a gap between the board and the uPVC cladding. The arrow indicates what appears to be a section of non-combustible board half the width of the charred board.

15. At the front showing the area spanning the party wall between 13 (on the left) and 15. The uPVC eaves soffit board of no 13 has been damaged but that of 15 is intact.

16. A closer view. The arrow indicates the top of the concrete post in line with the party wall. It is covered up to eaves level by board material. Part of the uPVC soffit has been torn away to reveal the lack of a cavity barrier to sub-divide the eaves void at the line of the party wall. Despite this short-coming, there has been no spread of fire through this part of the void, as can be seen by the lack of fire damage to the timbers visible to the right of the post.